For the last few weeks I have been reading obsessively everything I can lay my hands on about the Battle of the Marne, the name given to the decisive engagements fought across the river valleys of the Seine, Marne, Petit Morin, Grand Morin and Ourcq, between Paris and Verdun, between 5 and 9 September 1914.

The literature is voluminous, and indeed repetitive, but the question I have been trying to answer is this: did the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) make a significant – or maybe even the decisive – difference to the result, as some have claimed then and subsequently?

This suggestion appears, at first sight, to be preposterous, given that the British deployed an army of only 70,000 to France in August, compared with the French 1,250,000 and the German 1,300,000. Even the Belgian Army numbered 117,000.

Deployment of German and French Armies – August 1914. Secret Brtiish and French Staff Plans for the BEF to join the left wing of the French Army.

This map shows the Concentration Areas of the Armies in August 1914 – red for German army, blue for the French and Belgians. The BEF is yet to deploy following the British Declaration of War on 4^th August. 

It is interesting to note that “saving France” was the explicit aim of the secret discussions, which the British Army had initiated the pre-War staff talks with the French Army to achieve. In papers for the key meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 23 August 1911, the British General Staff stated:

“In the case of our remaining neutral, Germany will fight France single handed. The armies of Germany and the fleets of Germany are much stronger than those of France, and the results of such a war can scarcely be doubted… In a single handed war France in all probability will be defeated…

The speedy dispatch of a force consisting of the entire regular army six divisions and one of cavalry could turn the tables… The actual disparity in numbers becomes less… and the numbers of the opposing forces at the decisive point would be so nearly equal during the opening and early actions of the war that it is possible for the allies to win some initial successes which might prove invaluable…?

So was the contribution of the BEF as invaluable as the General Staff thought it would be?